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to apply them. Unfortunately, a
disconnect often exists between
principles and practice. Students
sometimes feel that principles are bor-
ing or irrelevant, but without them,
they can’t go beyond “cookbook”
remedies. In contrast, the competitive
nature of matching wits with cyber-
adversaries can be stimulating, but
with perceptions molded by hyper-
bolic news accounts, students can find
critical conceptual issues elusive. As in
many disciplines, effective informa-
tion security requires both a practical
and tacit understanding of the science
and art of security engineering.
Laboratory experiments can help
convey these concepts, but a wide
range of large-scale, realistic experi-
ments would be too costly for most
classrooms. Simulations thus provide a
helpful alternative.
To address the need for realistic
laboratory simulations, educators and
researchers have begun exploring the
use of games for purposes other than
entertainment, such as for education.
By capturing students’ imaginations
and generating a sense of competi-
tion, games provide a stimulating en-
vironment in which the participant
has a stake in the outcome. This emo-
tional investment makes the student
an active learner, and the visualization
associated with a game can often help
to teach or reinforce concepts.
CyberCIEGE is a high-end,
commercial-quality video game de-
veloped jointly by Rivermind and
the Naval Postgraduate School’s
Center for Information Systems Se-
curity Studies and Research.1–3 This
dynamic, extensible game adheres to




CyberCIEGE is a resource-
management simulation in which
the player assumes the role of a deci-
sion maker for an IT-dependent or-
ganization. The objective is to keep
the organization’s virtual users
happy and productive while provid-
ing the necessary security measures
to protect valuable information as-
sets. Players face a limitless number
of potential scenarios in which they
have budgets and must make
choices regarding procedural, tech-
nical, and physical security. With
good choices, the organization
prospers and the scenario advances;
poor choices often result in disaster.
Using the potential tension be-
tween strong security and user pro-
ductivity, CyberCIEGE illustrates
that many security choices involve
risk management. 
Games such as Electronic Arts’
The Sims and Atari’s Roller-
Coaster Tycoon illustrate the po-
tential for resource-simulation
tools to capture users’ attention.
They let players engage in planning
and construction and observe the
results of their choices. Cyber-
CIEGE has a similar goal: players
build and configure networks of
computers, and their choices have
visible effects on virtual users’ abil-
ity to perform productive work
and on attackers’ ability to com-
promise assets. The scenarios strive
to give students an emotional at-
tachment to that which they build,
thereby providing a more acute
learning experience when poor
decisions lead to loss.
Each CyberCIEGE scenario in-
cludes a briefing that describes an
enterprise (for example, a business
that manufactures bowling balls)
and gives the player information
about what’s required to help make
the enterprise successful.  Within
each scenario, the enterprise has a
predefined security policy and set
of users, assets, and user goals. The
game’s graphic design, shown in
Figure 1, enhances each scenario’s
realism. 
CyberCIEGE is designed to
make it easy to create new scenarios
that are tailored to specific audi-
ences and topics. To even begin to
cover the full range of cybersecurity
topics requires numerous scenarios
with different focus points and
depths of detail. CyberCIEGE lets
educators tailor scenarios for partic-
ular teaching objectives, and ad-
vanced students can even create
their own scenarios. For example, a
student might create an information
security policy and imagine the











ybersecurity students need to understand both
the impact that poor security choices can have on
an organization’s health and the concrete steps
that can improve security within it. In short, they
must understand information assurance (IA) principles and how 
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from trying to enforce it while let-
ting users achieve their goals. This
can help students learn that if they
begin with an unenforceable secu-
rity policy, no number of mecha-
nisms will be sufficient for them to
win the game.
CyberCIEGE elements
CyberCIEGE consists of several
elements: a simulation engine, a
scenario-definition language, a
scenario-development tool, and a
video-enhanced encyclopedia. The
first three are used to construct Cy-
berCIEGE scenarios, whereas the last
can be used to augment the game’s in-
structional capacity.  Designers de-
scribe scenarios in a specialized sce-
nario-definition language, which
the underlying simulation engine
interprets at game time. To simplify
scenario development, Cyber-
CEIGE also includes a scenario-def-
inition tool.
Simulation engine
At its foundation, CyberCIEGE
contains Rivermind’s console-based
Tybolt game engine, which is
designed for both games and simula-
tions. Tybolt is built around a multi-
platform 3D graphics library that
supports imported, standards-based
objects and animations as well as
Windows-like user interfaces within
a fully 3D environment. The engine
contains an artificial intelligence sys-
tem, video-playback library, sound
library, memory-management sys-
tem, resource-management system,
and real-time economic engine de-




CyberCIEGE is built around a lan-
guage through which scenario de-
signers can express security-related
risk management trade-offs, which
the simulation engine interprets and
presents as a simulation. Players’ ex-
periences and the consequences of
their choices are functions of the
scenario as expressed through the
scenario-definition language. The
language includes five major ele-
ments that allow security policies to
be actualized in realistic networked
environments.
Assets. Assets are various kinds of
information that users must access
to be productive—secret formulas,
corporate accounting information,
business plans, and marketing mate-
rials, for example. In a school, the
assets might include student
records, lesson plans, alumni lists,
and admissions files. The enter-
prise pays a cost if an asset’s secrecy
or integrity is compromised; asset
values present varying levels of mo-
tivation for attacks against them.
Developers can associate cost and
motive values with individual assets
or entire sets (for example, “propri-
etary”), as well as tie values to other
users with different access autho-
rizations to those assets. Assets also
have different secrecy, integrity, and
availability values.
Users. Virtual users are typically
employees whose productive work
makes money for the enterprise.
Their work goals sometimes in-
clude the need to access specific as-
sets in various ways. Users also
sometimes need to share assets,
perhaps simultaneously accessing
multiple assets. Users have different
authorizations to access assets as de-
fined by the enterprise’s security
policy. The student must provide
the appropriate resources and envi-
ronment to let users reach their
goals. Goals can be abstract or spe-
cific and can directly affect the
enterprise’s balance sheet and em-
ployee morale.
Zones. Each scenario includes one
or more physical zones that can con-
trol virtual users’ physical move-
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Figure 1. CyberCIEGE virtual users at work. This scene depicts an enterprise for which
the player must make IT choices that will affect virtual users.
Figure 2. Office floor plan highlighting a zone.
Players can provide zones with different physical
levels of protection so that the enterprise 
security policy can be implemented through a
combination of IT and physical mechanisms.
Education
ments. When players purchase IT
components, they place them within
specific zones. Figure 2 illustrates a
scenario in which the entire office is
a zone; it can contain additional
zones to which additional security
measures are applied.
Conditions and triggers. The sce-
nario designer defines conditions
that the engine assesses during play,
and specifies actions that occur as the
result of combinations of conditions.
For example, the player must per-
form a new set of actions when a vir-
tual user receives a new asset goal.
Designers use conditions and triggers
to define winning and losing, as well
as to specify what types of attacks
occur (or don’t occur) in response to
various conditions. They can use
pop-up windows and a moving mes-
sage ticker at the bottom of the
screen to show the player’s progress,
provide hints, or present complaints
from unhappy users. Players then see
different debriefing screens depend-
ing on how the game ends.
Objectives and phases. Scenarios
can be divided into several phases, in
which players must satisfy one or
more objectives, defined in terms of
conditions. Scenario designers can
guide students’ activities and provide
incremental achievements by re-
quiring them to achieve every ob-
jective in the current phase before
transitioning to the next.
Scenario-
development tool
Figure 3 shows a typical screen from
the scenario-development tool.
This form-based tool frees the
designer from wrestling with the
scenario-definition language’s so-
phisticated and demanding syntax.
It supports reusable libraries of sce-
nario elements (for example,
groups of users or assets),4 and the
development environment includes
tools for compiling, validating, and
running newly constructed scenar-
ios as simulations.
Single scenarios can be well-
defined IA teaching units. Combin-
ing them into campaigns lets
teachers create coherent sequences
of progressively more difficult sce-
narios or focused training units that
cover multiple topics.5
Encyclopedia
Players can invoke the CyberCIEGE
encyclopedia at any time. Context-
sensitive encyclopedia entries ex-
plain how to play the game. Other
entries describe a broad range of IA
topics, including policies, passwords,
network security devices, malicious
software, and access control mecha-
nisms. To complement the material
in the encyclopedia, CyberCEIGE
includes a set of movies that cover se-
curity policy, malicious software,
firewalls, assurance, and how to use
the game. The movies are designed
to be understandable and entertain-
ing to all audiences.
CyberCIEGE use
Every scenario starts with a briefing
that describes the enterprise for
which computer resources must be
managed. Players are responsible for
activities such as configuring and
networking existing computer com-
ponents, making physical and proce-
dural security choices, hiring IT sup-
port staff, and purchasing specific
components and connecting them to
the networks. 
With a limited budget, the player
must make money for the enterprise
by efficiently and securely manag-
ing the networks. This requires an
understanding of all user goals—
that is, each virtual user’s needs for
access to different assets. The users
must have suitable computer com-
ponents, software, network inter-
connections, and technical-support
personnel to achieve their goals.
The player must create and main-
tain an environment in which assets
are protected in accordance with the
enterprise security policy. Failure to
adequately protect the assets results
in monetary losses to the enterprise
due to both direct loss and lost user
productivity. This involves several
kinds of choices:
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Figure 3. Scenario-development tool. The scenario-definition language’s syntactic
complexity can result in scenario definitions that are thousands of lines for even simple
scenarios; the scenario-development tool hides this complexity and simplifies scenario
construction.
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• component selection and deploy-
ment,
• component configuration,
• component interconnection using
networks,
• user instruction and training,
• physical security restrictions, and
• user background-check levels.
These security choices affect the pro-
tections provided to the enterprise
assets, which are subject to attack
from vandals, disgruntled employees,
professional attackers, incompetent
users, and acts of nature.
Players typically construct net-
works and make policy-enforcement
decisions prior to starting a simula-
tion. Once the simulation begins,
virtual users start creating and ac-
cessing their assets—sometimes in
ways that make the assets vulnerable
to attack.
During the game, which can be
paused at any time, players can select
and observe the status of a user’s pro-
ductivity and happiness. Users who
are unable to achieve their goals be-
come visibly agitated. This is in-
tended to increase the player’s sense
of urgency—numerous unhappy
users can create a stressful situation
for the IT department. 
T he Naval Postgraduate School re-leased a limited-distribution ver-
sion of CyberCIEGE in February
2005, specifically for US government
use. Rivermind then released the first
commercial version in April. The
CyberCIEGE Web site (http://cisr.
nps.navy.mil/cyberciege.html) serves
as a repository for scenarios created
by NPS and other educators, as well
as a place for end users to provide
feedback. We hope to work with or-
ganizations to tailor CyberCIEGE to
meet their specific teaching require-
ments, including developing new
scenarios, extending the simulation,
or adding new artwork.
The scenario-definition lan-
guage contains triggers that result
in output to an activity log, which
teachers can use for assessing stu-
dents and to identify topics for fur-
ther instruction. We’re working on
a preliminary set of assessment
tools for the logs to increase the
system’s value to educators. We’re
also beginning an effort to examine
the human factors that might im-
prove teaching success for the game
among various student popula-
tions, which might differ according
to age, gender, education, and
other factors. 
Advanced versions of Cyber-
CIEGE could take several forms,
including wireless and multiplayer
versions. The current version con-
tains no mobile users or wireless
components. Adding such tech-
nologies to the existing simulation
would significantly advance its abil-
ity to depict emerging architectures.
The competitive and dynamic na-
ture of a multiplayer version would
further engage and challenge stu-
dents as they worked to protect and
provide services to their virtual or-
ganizations while finding and ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities in their
competitors’ systems. We’re cur-
rently conducting preliminary re-
search for a multiplayer version of
CyberCIEGE. 
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